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Army Transformation: A Tale of Two Doctrines
DAVID JABLONSKY

From Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp. 43-62.

Not since General Hans von Seeckt's efforts with the German Reichswehr in the early 1920s has a military
organization so self-consciously set about transforming itself as the US Army today. It is part of an overall process that
has been met with enthusiastic endorsements ranging from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to congressionally-mandated blue ribbon panels. Still, specifics concerning the process have been hard
to come by, with one defense analyst noting the similarity of "transformation" as a military concept to the Christian
idea of transubstantiation: "No one is exactly sure what it means, but most believers have an opinion about it."[1]
Generally, however, the concept is linked with the idea of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The interest in this
revolution in the early 1990s led by the end of the decade to a growing acceptance of the need for military
transformation if the RMA were to be achieved. Thus, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group defined
military transformation as "the set of activities by which DOD attempts to harness the revolution in military affairs to
make fundamental changes in technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and organizational structure."[2] The
process, then, combines the acquisition of new military systems with appropriate divestiture and modifications dealing
with doctrine and organization--all focused on maximizing the capabilities of future armed forces.
To jump-start this process, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, began in the fall of 1999 to invest
in current off-the-shelf equipment to stimulate the development of doctrine and organizational design even as the
Army began a search for the new technologies that would deliver the material for a future force. That force would be
strategically responsive and dominant across a full spectrum of operations ranging from peacetime military
engagement to smaller-scale contingencies to major theater war. The swiftness of the process, General Shinseki
acknowledged, would be "unnerving to some."[3] Nevertheless, there was an urgency to the transformation process for
the Army, concerned with becoming more relevant in a rapidly changing geostrategic environment in which strategic
speed and lethality could no longer successfully exist as separate variables. "All our combat power is useless if we
cannot get it to the theater in time or maneuver it tactically," Major General James Dubik, the head of the experimental
force at Fort Lewis, pointed out. "Right now our heavy forces have limited strategic deployability and our light forces
have limited tactical utility. Transformation will take care of that disconnect."[4]
How well Army transformation is able to deal with that disconnect, however, will depend a great deal on future US
policy concerning the use of military force. At one extreme is the so-called Powell Doctrine, a relatively restrictive
approach to the subject. At the other extreme is what has popularly come to be called the Clinton Doctrine, a more
liberal prescription for the use of force. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how those two doctrines will
influence the transformation of the US Army as it struggles to move forward toward a genuine revolution in military
affairs, and how that transformation process can in turn mitigate the worst excesses of both doctrines. In the end, it is
the ability of the US Army to use the new technology for the application of military force that will determine the
success of the RMA. In this regard, it is appropriate to remember why Thomas Huxley remained unimpressed at the
end of the 19th century by all the knowledge, machinery, and power that had extended human competence over the
physical environment. "The great issue," he pointed out, "about which hangs a true sublimity and the terror of
overhanging fate is, what are you going to do with all these things?"[5]
Army Transformation
To assert that the seeds of Army transformation were planted in the unused AH-64 Apache helicopters on the
Albanian-Kosovo border in 1999 is to do a disservice to the decades-long efforts by the US Army to solve the problem
of how to field a force light enough to be projected quickly on a global basis and lethal enough to dominate upon
arrival. In the 1980s, the Army attempted to address this problem by transforming itself with the concept of the High-

Technology Light Division (HTLD). That effort succumbed to bureaucratic infighting by 1988, leaving a window of
vulnerability clearly demonstrated two years later when the US line in the Saudi Arabian sand was held for several
weeks only by the lightly armed and relatively immobile forces of the 82d Airborne Division and a Marine
Expeditionary Force.[6] From the Gulf War to 1997, the pace of US military operations increased by at least 300
percent even as the armed forces were buffeted by cuts in structure, weapon programs, and personnel strength. During
that period, the Army conducted a series of futures efforts beginning with the 1992 series of simulations and exercises
known as the Louisiana Maneuvers. That program gave way to the Force XXI process, a series of experiments in
warfighting designed to generate and test new ideas. Next came the Army After Next project, the use of studies,
conferences, and war games to postulate those elements of the RMA on which the Army should focus in future
geostrategic environments. These programs involved separate but complementary processes coordinated through
distinct light and heavy modernization plans along similar, not common, system and organizational designs. The result
was a continued bifurcation of the force between heavy and light units.[7]
From this extended perspective, the Army's problems with Task Force Hawk simply highlighted the need to accelerate
experimental efforts to solve a long-simmering problem. Landpower enthusiasts might point out that much analysis of
the Serbian campaign failed to take into account the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army that complemented the
NATO attack. But there was no disguising the fact that the 11-week campaign had been decided by the 730 Air Force,
Navy, and Marine aircraft, ranging from Cold War F-16s to the newest B-2s, that flew more than 36,000 sorties. In the
wake of that campaign, there was considerable conjecture about the Army's strategic relevancy in newspaper and
magazine articles.[8] The Deputy Secretary of Defense was even more direct. "If the Army holds onto nostalgic
versions of its grand past," he warned in August 1999, "it is going to atrophy and die."[9] It was a message concerning
deployability, lethality, and sustainability that was well understood in the Army. "We are committed to remain
relevant," General Dubik pointed out, "able to respond quickly, and provide the appropriate forces for . . .
contingencies."[10]
The key to Army relevancy is an Army transformation process that rests on four foundations: the conduct of future
war, the future operating environment, the increasing significance of full-spectrum operations, and the diminished
utility of the current force. Together, these elements compel the current Army process toward a combination of
evolutionary and revolutionary change. It is, in short, a self-styled "balanced" approach designed to fully capitalize on
leap-ahead technology while retaining current warfighting capabilities.[11] But the Army process also recognizes that
emerging technologies cannot alone produce an RMA, that they serve as enablers for much more far-reaching changes
in doctrine, concepts, and organization, which together cause fundamentally new ways of conducting military
operations. At some critical point, the cumulative effects of technical advances and military innovation in all these
areas invalidate former conceptual structures and cause a basic alteration in accepted definitions and measurements of
military effectiveness. Such experimentation, however, is not easy; and in fact the Defense Science Board Task Force
has called it "an unnatural act" for any large, established organization.[12] Moreover, as General Dubik has cautioned,
"There is no guarantee to any of this. There is no playbook. There is no answer book."
We must . . . make sure we get it close to right. We know we will not get it precisely right. But our job is
not to get it so wrong that we hamstring the next generation of leaders. We have to get it right enough, so
that in 2015, when the nation asks the Army to do something, it is flexible enough to accomplish any
potential mission.[13]
The Interim Force is the centerpiece in the balanced process of "getting it right." The force consists of medium-weight
Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) designed "to meet a near-term strategic requirement that now is absent, as
well as to prepare the Army for the long-term."[14] To achieve these goals, the IBCTs will operate within the current
division structures and provide a complementary capability to the current light and heavy units that comprise the
existing Legacy Force. At the same time, the IBCTs will act as a bridging force until science and technology allow the
realization of the Objective Force, the ultimate Army product of the RMA. The key to the bridging process is the
development of the Future Combat System (FCS), which is to combine the capabilities of the current howitzers, main
battle tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles while weighing in at not more than 20 tons--a figure in dramatic contrast,
for example, to the 70 tons of the M1A1 Abrams tank. Once the FCS emerges, it will be adopted by the Legacy and
Interim Forces, which will then merge into the Objective Force.[15]

The Interim Force concept is a revolutionary bridge to the future Objective Force. To begin with, the IBCT is not a
theoretical construct, but a test-bed force with goals of deploying a brigade to a forward base within four days, a
division within five days, and five divisions within 30 days. And yet the units are being created without waiting for the
development of new technology. Instead, the Army is focused on evaluating and refining the operations and
organizational concept for these forces derived from the envisioned future environment in which the units would
operate, from the kind of characteristics desired in the force, and from the capabilities that would then be required.
This type of parallel effort is designed to produce a complete RMA when the emerging technology comes on line,
unlike those incomplete revolutions in the past when doctrine and organization lagged the new technology as they did
with the so-called "dead hand" of Napoleon in the American Civil War and with the French pursuit of offensive à
outrance at the beginning of World War I. "As we develop the IBCTs at Fort Lewis, train them, and get the doctrine
right," General Dubik notes in this regard, "we will be producing the doctrine and training that we need for the
Objective Force."[16] As technology produces the revolutionary breakthroughs necessary to complement this doctrine,
distinctions between the bifurcated force will blur, with the Objective Force taking on the lethality associated with
heavy units and the agility that is the mark of light units.
At the other end of the Army's balanced linkage, the relationship of the Interim and Legacy Forces is more
conservative--founded on a determination by the Army "not to permit" transformation to compromise near-term
warfighting capabilities.[17] From this perspective, the IBCT is designed to bolster the current Legacy Force by
enhancing the ability of the regional CINCs and Joint Task Force commanders to respond. For the Legacy light
division, the Interim unit will become the most mobile, lethal, and survivable element, extending the division's tactical
mobility while increasing the organic firepower in support of dismounted operations, and thus will likely be employed
in the main divisional effort. On the other hand, the IBCT will probably be the first brigade to deploy as part of a
heavy division in order to consolidate and extend the security of air and sea ports of debarkation, thus facilitating the
reception, staging, and onward integration of the remainder of the division. The new formations will also provide a
dramatic improvement in national and theater conventional deterrence by presenting the National Command
Authorities with the capability to position a credible and flexible combat force on the ground anywhere in the world
within 96 hours. At the same time, the accelerated development of the initial Interim brigades will provide impetus to
the transformation process by allowing the training and development of soldiers and leaders in the doctrine and
organization of these new formations without compromising the Army's basic raison d'être of winning wars.[18]
In all this, a major issue for the Legacy Force is divestiture of old technology, organization, and doctrine--a key
element if the Army's revolution in military affairs is ultimately to be complete. The Army has already restructured
five major programs and cancelled seven others in order to free $16 billion for the transformation effort. Whether the
right systems and doctrine are available for that process depends on the Army's ability to maintain a viable Legacy
Force. But 75 percent of that force already exceeds its service half-life. Moreover, as the Legacy Force comes to the
end of that cycle, there will be increasing costs for operations and maintenance--producing further pressure for
recapitalization, the replacement (as opposed to modernization) of aging systems.[19] One solution is to identify and
prioritize modernization or recapitalization for those Legacy systems that have applicability for the Objective Force.
Some systems, however, need to be continued even if they don't fall in this category, since their elimination would
pose too great a risk to the Legacy guarantee of near-term warfighting capabilities. The Heavy Equipment Transporter
(HET) system, for example, is required to replace an aging fleet of trucks that will carry the tanks, Bradleys, and
howitzers until transformation is effected.
Ultimately, there is no pat solution to the tension between divestiture concerned with a Legacy Force and the need to
hedge against an uncertain future. It is a tension that is particularly sharp for the military profession, which has little
room for any illusions about the stakes in national security affairs. "If you have lost a battle," G. K. Chesterton once
noted, "you cannot believe that you have won it."[20] There is no guarantee, for example, that the technology for the
Objective Force will materialize, potentially leaving a "worst-of-both-worlds" force that could still consume
substantial amounts of strategic lift, while lacking combat punch and sustainability. Nor is it ever a certainty that some
new technological variant will be correctly understood. Thus, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig--a year into World War
I--could inform the War Office that "the machine-gun is a much overrated weapon; two per battalion is more than
sufficient."[21] There is also no assurance that emerging doctrine and concepts will survive a future test, as was
demonstrated by the Maginot Line, an efficient and effective use of military resources in terms of the static trench
warfare of World War I, but useless against the mobile German army doctrine of 1940. Most important, there is the

overriding need to retain a near-term strategic hedge of readiness for major theater war. Thus, it is not surprising that
the Army has adopted a conservative resourcing strategy during transformation designed to keep:
a balance of old and new systems to maintain readiness for today while preparing for the future. This
strategy will selectively retain or extend the life of legacy systems, synchronize divestiture with
acquisition, and bring new systems as rapidly as possible in accordance with new operational
concepts.[22]
The tension between the Legacy and Objective Forces was reflected in a draft General Accounting Office (GAO)
report provided to the Army in January 2001 that identified risk in the transformation efforts. The development of the
Objective Force, the report asserted, represented the Army's "foremost challenge" because of uncertainty as to whether
the required technology would mature enough to enable the development of the Future Combat System as envisioned
or in time to meet the transformation schedule. The Army, the report added, should consider achieving Objective
Force capabilities in stages--a strategy that could provide worthwhile increases in capability but might also require a
continuation of Legacy and Interim Forces "longer than anticipated." The Army's response was that the report overly
focused on equipment, ignoring the Army's "holistic" approach, which also involved the considerable progress being
made in organizational, doctrinal, and institutional change. Focusing on acquisition alone, one source concluded, was
like "looking through a Coke bottle . . . at the stars."[23]
In any event, the Army leadership was bent on further expediting the transformation effort. On 1 March 2001, the
Chief of Staff announced that the Army would lose relevancy if an Objective Force capability was not fielded by 2010.
There would be no waiting for the development of better systems if it meant slowing down the transformation process.
"This is about speed," General Shinseki added.[24] As a consequence, the Army would increase funding in the
integrated Future Combat System for fiscal years 2003 to 2008. In April 2003 there would be a readiness review of the
FCS in order to select the best technologies and concepts for the next phase of the process. "We will make the tough
calls; we will shift resources to the most promising technical solutions." The second milestone would be the
development and demonstration of a prototype FCS model beginning in FY 06. "Our intent," the Chief concluded, "is
to accelerate the transition to research and development by collapsing traditional lines."[25]
This was hardly good news for those within the Army who already perceived transformation as challenging the most
cherished service assumptions. Not surprisingly, some heavy armor and artillery advocates had indicated resistance, as
had some in the aviation community concerned about the lack of reference to Army aviation attack units.[26] And the
fact that the Interim Force would rely on fire support from Air Force, Navy, and coalition assets was perceived by
some as an abandonment of the Army's organic role in deep attack.[27] Outside the Army, one official of the Air
Force Association summarized that service's position in the post-Kosovo conflict era by asserting that "transformation
cannot take place without a shift in service roles from the current emphasis on surface warfare to aero-space
warfare."[28] And the Commandant of the Marine Corps warned against attempts by each service to claim that it was
the "expeditionary force" of choice for the nation. "There is no way," he pointed out, "that the entire armed forces of
the United States can fit into the tip of the spear."[29]
The Powell and Clinton Doctrines
"What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Madeleine
Albright pointedly asked of Colin Powell during his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[30] This
exasperated question reflected a difference in outlook that was set in train in November 1984 when Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger formulated six criteria for the use of US military force overseas: Involvement of vital
national interests; clear intention of winning; clearly defined political and military objectives; a constant reassessment
of objectives and forces; a reasonable assurance of public and congressional support prior to commitment; and the use
of US forces as a last resort.[31] By the early 1990s, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Powell was dealing with a new,
more complicated geostrategic landscape of failed states, civil wars, and ethnic conflicts. As a result he began to move
away somewhat from a doctrine that was virtually immune to ambiguity. Instead of "last resort," there would be the
limited use of the military for political reasons: "When force is used deftly--in smooth coordination with diplomatic
and economic policy--bullets may never have to fly." This, in turn, meant a wider range of military missions across a
spectrum of operations that could be far removed from a rigid focus on vital interests: "I believe peacekeeping and

humanitarian operations are a given."[32] And in his final public address before retiring as Chairman, Powell
acknowledged that clear objectives were not always possible in the use of military force, that situations often were
ambiguous and "murky."[33] By that time Powell could warn that there was "no fixed set of rules for the use of
military force" and that to establish such criteria was dangerous.[34]
All this notwithstanding, Powell still found that Weinberger's criteria were a "practical guide" when it came to the
relevant questions concerned with matching force and objectives. Most important, the guideline of national interest
intensity was still critical for him in terms of prioritization and sustainment in the use of any military force--a
Clausewitzian linkage that he always appreciated. "Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its
political object," the Prussian philosopher had long ago warned, "the value of this object must determine the sacrifices
to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration."[35] Thus, as the former Yugoslavia began to come apart in 1991,
Powell urged a caution based on a variant of the Weinberger Doctrine that, while adjusting the last resort criterion and
acknowledging the role of early force intervention, still called for a policy of selective global engagement primarily
based on US national interests. The Chairman's rationale also included such Weinberger derivatives as the use of
overwhelming force for clear political and military objectives and a need for constant reassessment of the relationship
of force utilization to these objectives as well as to the American people and their representatives. Soon, what quickly
came to be known as the Powell Doctrine was being interpreted by its critics as a reluctance to intervene anywhere
with military force, unless the intervention was so massively disproportionate as to become virtually free of risk. But
Powell was having none of it. "Decisive means and results are always to be preferred," he wrote at the time, "even if
they are not always possible."
We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little
surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a
new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation. . . . History has not been kind to
this approach.[36]
At the beginning of President Clinton's first term in office, Powell had considerable influence on the President with
this type of thinking concerning the use of force. In the last two years of that first Administration, however, with
General Powell out of office, the President increasingly resorted to the use of military force across a full spectrum of
operations--to the extent that in the 1996 presidential campaign, Senator Dole noted that the Clinton Administration
had initiated more military deployments than any of its predecessors. In the second Administration, Kosovo resulted in
further fin de siecle twists to the emerging Clinton Doctrine. For the President, morals and values as much as
geopolitics played a key role, with every cruise missile and bomb in that conflict aimed not only at destroying the
Serbian national will, but also at demolishing the idea that leaders could commit criminal acts so long as they acted
within their own country. For the first time, one Administration official explained, Clinton was stating that "genocide
is in and of itself a national interest where we should attack."[37] The President elaborated on this theme in an
exuberant speech to NATO troops in Macedonia following the successful conclusion of the Kosovo campaign. In this
brave new world, he emphasized, national sovereignty would be subordinated to human rights. In terms of "ethnic or
religious conflict" in the world, universality would be "an important principle" that he hoped would be applied in the
future "whether within or beyond" the borders of a country.[38]
In the wake of Kosovo, the President continued to give pride of place to values in the basic components of his
emerging doctrine for the use of force. First, there was the increasingly pessimistic appraisal of the international
security environment--"a viper's nest of perils," in Secretary Albright's description, ranging from terrorism and
international crime to computer hackers and genocidal violence.[39] The second ingredient of the Clinton Doctrine was
the assumption, as the dominant world power with global economic interests in an increasingly interdependent
environment, that the United States had a vested interest in the maintenance of international stability, of world
order.[40] The third component was the conviction that in order to achieve international stability, the United States
must maintain sufficient forces to conduct simultaneous military action against multiple adversaries--a primary
constabulary mission for American military power to ensure the system didn't break down, causing globalization to
fail. Implicit in this linkage to world order was the idea that the best way to maintain stability in areas that truly
mattered to the United States was to diminish instability in other areas, however unimportant that instability might
appear, before it could build in intensity and spread to areas of significant interest. It was, as Secretary Albright
demonstrated, the harnessing of the "domino theory" to the concept of shaping. "Common sense tells us," she

commented, "that it is sometimes better to deal with instability when it is still at arm's length than to wait until it is at
our doorstep."[41] President Clinton was even more explicit in terms of the shaping function in a February 1999
speech that foreshadowed the bombing decision in Serbia:
It's easy . . . to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia, or who
owns a strip of brush land in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But
the true measure of our interests lies in not how small or distant these places are, or in whether we have
trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security
of letting conflicts fester and spread.[42]
In the end, the criteria that are popularly ascribed to both doctrines are only factors to be considered, not absolute
requirements like those of Just War doctrine. Moreover, because the Powell Doctrine has moved somewhat from the
strict constructionist Weinberger position, and because the Clinton Doctrine began its early evolution when Powell was
Chairman of the JCS, there are many similarities. Both believe in using force in conjunction with the other elements of
national power; both recognize that force may be used in a wide spectrum of situations, including those involving
peace and humanitarian operations; and both believe in the use of quick, overwhelming, and decisive force for clear
military and political objectives. In terms of applying that decisive force, the Clinton approach is generally to rely on
stand-off, high-tech weapons, while the Powell Doctrine includes a basic distrust of technology as a panacea in the use
of force, combined with a recognition that conflict resolution always requires, and conflict termination nearly always
requires, the use of landpower.
The Powell Doctrine is often described as a strategy of reluctance focused on a narrowly defined concept of national
security which, if taken too literally, can amount "to virtual isolationism again, via the great circle route."[43] But with
its emphasis on national interests and a finite amount of resources, the Powell Doctrine ensures a selectivity in nearand mid-term shaping and responding activities in order to prepare for future regional and near-peer threats. On the
other hand, the Clinton Doctrine has been accused of a willingness to use military force only when the political cost of
standing aloof exceeded the cost of a carefully staged and limited intervention. Moreover, there is the general charge
of doctrinal inconsistency in an administration that never made clear why the United States pulled out of Somalia,
elected to stay out of Rwanda, or stayed out of Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor for as long as it did, then elected to
intervene in the way that it did.[44] But by emphasizing shaping and responding activities across a full spectrum of
operations in the near- and mid-term, the Clinton Doctrine offers the potential of preparing for the future by using
military force to resolve crises, prevent conflicts and instability, and deter aggression--all of which could lead to the
outbreak of major wars. Ultimately, there will be some mix of the two doctrines in the Bush Administration, which
will, in turn, determine the mix of the shape-respond-prepare strategic variables. That combination will directly affect
the Army transformation process and determine if the United States in the future can avoid both Munich-like
appeasements and Vietnam-like quagmires.
Revolution or Evolution?
At first blush, the Clinton Doctrine appears made to order for Army transformation. To begin with, there is the
balanced shape-respond-prepare approach to the full spectrum of operations, a rich source of experimentation for the
Interim Force as it moves toward the versatile Objective Force. That very versatility can ensure that the Army remains
the most relevant and effective force for shaping the international environment. Added to this are the transformation
products of increased deployability, lethality, and sustainability, which can provide the Army a rapid-response
capability across the full spectrum of operations as a warfighting force and a strategic deterrent. Prior to conflict, this
force capability can also buy US authorities critical time for analysis and assessment as well as impart a synergism to
other diplomatic, economic, and political crisis resolution tools. The problem is that this balanced shape-respondprepare approach is a good defense strategy only if it is adequately resourced. If not, it can be disastrous, particularly in
the absence of clearly articulated priorities on where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage risk. In that
kind of environment, trying to square the means/end circle of full-spectrum dominance has left the services in a
position in their transformation efforts, as Andrew Krepinevich has described it, "of trying to create bricks without
straw."[45] This has been particularly hard on the Army, which in its pursuit of post-Cold War relevancy under a
doctrine bent on maintaining world order and stability by "policing democracy's empire," has been hoist with its own
petard of accepting the concept of full-spectrum dominance--a dilemma nicely summarized by General Dubik:

Crises arise and we cannot say "no" to the National Command Authorities. If the President says, "Go to
Kosovo," we do not say, "Gee, we are kind of busy." And when he says, "Remember, besides Bosnia you
have to train for major theater war," we do not say "Hey, we could sure use a break." If things heat up in
East or Southwest Asia, the call is not, "Are you ready?" It is simply "Go."[46]
The result of all this is an environment in which it is difficult to effect fundamental transformation. Certainly the
current operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the force is a far cry from that of the 1920s, a period often cited as a model
for military innovation. "It is not about money," one DOD official commented in this regard: "They were as poor as
church mice, but their best minds had time on their hands, figuring out where to go. A lot of talent was geared toward
developing new doctrine. Today our personnel don't think about these kinds of issues."[47] For the Army, this lack of
organizational slack is particularly significant. In a recent war game played in preparation for the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), for example, an Interim division was used in the later years of the game period. The
conclusion was that the Army is and will be the most highly used of the services across the entire spectrum of
operations.[48]
Not surprisingly, so far the Powell Doctrine pervades the philosophy for the use of force in the Bush Administration.
For National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, US national interests must be the primary basis for such use. "It
takes courage to set priorities," she has commented: "Using the American armed forces as the world's `911' will
degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles, and fuel concern among the great powers that the
United States has decided to enforce notions of `limited sovereignty' worldwide in the name of humanitarianism."[49]
President Bush was equally adamant, pointing out that he would avoid "missions without end" and not send troops "to
stop ethnic cleansing and genocide" outside US national interests. "Nor do I think we ought to try to be the
peacekeepers all around the world," he concluded. "When America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the
goal must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming."[50]
The adoption of this more selective approach to global engagement was accompanied by a well-publicized campaign
for DOD transformation with the goal of obtaining dramatic improvements of military effectiveness at reduced cost. To
this end, the President announced that he had given Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "a broad mandate to
challenge the status quo as we design a new architecture for the defense of America. . . . Our goal is to move beyond
marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy."[51] Implicit in this type of
accelerated approach to transformation is the existence of greater short-term risk for a long-term payoff, which only
intensifies the paradox of the investment/divestment tensions between the Legacy Force and the Objective Force. On
the one hand, there is the question of whether the new technology will mature quickly enough to meet the Army's
ambitious transformation schedule. On the other, there is the approaching obsolescence of many of the Army's
systems--one of the reasons for the acceleration to 2010 of the FCS fielding objective, which in turn brings the
question full circle back to the speed of technology maturation.[52]
In all this, the Army's position remains that there is a need to maintain a substantive Legacy Force in order to hedge
against such uncertainties. It is a position that is not helped by the well-publicized recapitalization effort for that force
with the 155mm Crusader howitzer, a weapon system so heavy--in a time of increased deployability emphasis--that an
Air Force C-5 will not be able to carry both the gun and its supply vehicle. For some, this smacks of a "Colonel
Blimp"-like reaction to change, typical of military inertia and epitomized by the British officer in the interwar years
who insisted on maintaining the horse in the artillery and cavalry "because thereby you will keep up the high standard
of intelligence in the man from his association with the horse."[53] From this perspective, as Eliot Cohen points out,
only a "ruthless retirement" of obsolete hardware will demonstrate "that Washington is finally serious about the
`Revolution in Military Affairs.'"[54] But the services are also aware of the dangers in switching modernization funds.
In 1994, for example, the Navy offered to drop below the authorized size of the fleet to free funds for developing
future capabilities. Instead, the projected savings were used to reduce budget shortfalls--a lesson that was not lost on
service chiefs when QDR discussions began.[55]
Such pressures are to be expected in the absence of major threats, after years of deferred modernization and readiness
problems, and given such Administration priorities as national missile defense. In that environment, there is a natural
temptation to focus on "revolutionary" concepts and technology at the expense of the Legacy Force. Certainly, there is
always the danger that a legacy force can diminish the transforming potential of new technology. The Interim Force

can do much to mitigate such a development by demonstrating that RMAs can come about not just by transforming all
elements of the force, but by identifying and exploiting synergies between the old and the new. The German army
between the world wars offers a striking example of this--using experimentation to determine what new systems and
capabilities would be needed, what legacy systems and capabilities should be sustained, and what kind of mix of the
two should be created. For example, legacy systems such as artillery were motorized to support the tanks. And great
care was taken to include the right mix of new capabilities--such as airborne, close air support, and radio
communication--with such legacy capabilities as engineer and logistics functions in order to produce optimum
capabilities for mechanized air-land operations.[56]
The Doctrinal Combination
The ascendancy of the more selective engagement of the Powell Doctrine in the Bush Administration should not be
overemphasized in terms of Army transformation. Americans associate themselves with Jefferson and Wilson, not
Machiavelli and Metternich. With the click of a TV remote control or a computer mouse, the American public can be
face-to-face with the realities of the post-Cold War world. The current President may choose his use of force at the
lower end of the operations spectrum more consistently and effectively than his predecessor. What he cannot do is
choose not to choose. The new environment is much more than just a balance-of-power world. In one way or another,
as Secretary Powell acknowledges, the United States cannot avoid the full spectrum of the Clinton Doctrine.
For the Army, the most critical area on that spectrum that is not addressed by transformation is peace operations. As
the recent experiences in both Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate, conflict termination in smaller-scale contingencies in
the new environment normally requires long-term peace enforcement for conflict resolution, usually provided by
ground troops. Given the charter of Army transformation, there is little to be gained in terms of technology, doctrine,
and organization experimentation by using the Interim Force in peace operations. Army transformation documents
make much of physical and mental agility and versatility that support "seamless transitions between benign and hostile
environments," but they admit that how that is to be accomplished "is not self-evident."[57] The fact remains that the
transformed Army as currently envisioned will not solve the dichotomy between peace operations and warfighting in
terms of readiness and training; nor will it ease the problem of OPTEMPO even under the most selective
implementation of the Powell Doctrine. Only by expanding the transformation effort to consider such experimental
concepts as a two-force army will the process face the full force implications of the crossover between the Powell and
Clinton Doctrines.[58]
Peace operations are symptomatic of the problems of trying to incorporate the two doctrines into a coherent strategy.
There is general agreement that some form of transformation must occur if the United States is to maintain its military
superiority into the future. Joint Vision 2020 provides a broad picture of that future, but little guidance concerning the
objectives, pace, and requirements. In particular, the Bush Administration will have to address the specific objectives
that should guide transformation and the degree of urgency for pursuing the process in order to articulate a defense
strategy. Decisions on what will be required in terms of investment and divestment will be necessary for programming
guidance. Finally, there must be risk accountability associated with the objectives, pace, and requirements established
in pursuit of transformation. A policy of accelerated transformation will have to account for any additional risks
concerning the ability of the US military to meet near- and mid-term requirements such as warfighting. On the other
hand, in the event of a more modest transformation effort, there will be a need to account for any risks in the ability of
the US armed forces to deal with future challenges. In any event, "ad hocism" will not do; there must be an
overarching framework to reconcile the two doctrines. "Case-by-caseism, even if done competently, is simply
inadequate," Richard Haass points out in this regard. "You pay a real price for not having a grand strategy."[59]
Another aspect of Joint Vision 2020 that has an impact on Army transformation is that the document discourages
jointness by preserving each service's distinct interests with its discrete separations of the concepts of dominant
maneuver and precision engagement. The result is a bifurcated intellectual revolution with competitive, not
complementary, traditions in the form of maneuver theory developed from Blitzkrieg doctrine and precision-strike
theory derived from interwar strategic bombing theory. All this only encourages each service to pursue its separate
path across the spectrum of operations, even to the point of perfecting concepts beyond the limit of meaningful joint
contributions and at the expense of other services. In the end, there is a critical requirement to bring together the
separate paths of the intellectual revolution. Joint experimentation needs to go beyond interoperability and the current

service "seams" to exploit integration, synergies, and interdependence in order to create and explore joint capabilities
that do not currently exist. In a time of limited resources, without new joint operational concepts and architecture, the
way the United States fights will not be fully transformed.[60]
For the Army, a defense-wide approach to transformation is axiomatic. More than any other branch of the armed
forces, the Army is dependent in fundamental ways on change within the other services. A transformed Army, for
example, will have far greater reliance in the future on remote fires and strategic mobility provided outside its
organization. As a result, the Army continues to emphasize that in the transformation process, "the services must
become more interdependent" and that this interdependence "is achieved through the deliberate, mutual reliance on the
capabilities of other services to maximize the synergy of the joint force while minimizing its vulnerabilities."[61] At
the same time, there is a recognition that Joint Forces Command has not yet become the authoritative voice on
transformation in the context of both force development and joint experimentation. Moreover, the CINCs of the
unified commands deal primarily with current threats and thus have a relatively short-term focus compared to the
services, which have the responsibility for the long-term equipping and training of the force. In this context, continued
Army experimentation can provide key input to what will have to become a joint venture in order, as the Army
recognizes, for a complete transformation process to occur.[62]
There has been a sense of urgency to that experimentation since the outset of the Army transformation effort--the idea,
in General Shinseki's words, that there is only "a narrow window," that "these conditions will not last for very
long."[63] Part of that urgency, of course, has to do with the growing obsolescence of the Legacy Force. But much of
it also has to do with the sense of ubiquitous and rapid technological change leavened by the understanding that
technology can provide only the promise of innovation, that it does not determine the process of change. That type of
determination can come only from the top, a process hindered by the maximum four-year tenure of an Army Chief of
Staff. In those circumstances, it is difficult to find time to create a transformation vision and attract a hard core of
innovators in the spirit of General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, who wrote to the British War Office in the 1920s that his
experimental armored forces should be connected with "many enthusiastic experts and visionaries . . . ; it doesn't
matter how wild their views are if only they have a touch of divine fire. I will supply the common sense of advanced
middle age."[64]
All this the Chief of Staff has set in train. The more difficult task is to institutionalize a process that can achieve his
vision. "Much of what we are up against," General Dubik points out, "is not technology but mindsets, institutional
obstacles. . . . Part of what we are doing involves breaking the bureaucracy and rebuilding it for the new force."[65]
Conclusion
"'Continuity' must reign over those principles, practices, and organizations that remain useful," General Dubik has
pointed out; "'change' over those variables that have lost their utility."[66] The combination of the Powell and Clinton
Doctrines will facilitate this interaction as the Army moves forward in the transformation process. Taken singly, each
doctrine could have adverse effects on that process. With just the Clinton approach, there would be little chance for the
Interim Force to influence the Objective Force, because it would be consumed in helping a Legacy constabulary force
to spread indiscriminately across the operations spectrum in the endless service of world order. Under these
circumstances, it would be difficult to make any substantial divestiture or to find time or incentive to change
organization, concepts, and doctrine. On the other hand, the Powell Doctrine when taken alone could cause the RMA
to become too narrowly focused on the Holy Grail of future peer threats, ignoring more immediate asymmetrical
challenges throughout the entire spectrum of operations. In that type of situation, there would be fewer opportunities to
try out full Interim Force improvements in organization and doctrine and more chance for premature divestment of the
Legacy Force.
In combination, the two doctrines have had a positive effect on Army transformation. There is the reminder from the
Clinton Doctrine of the worth of shaping and responding in terms of deterrence and compellance, all of which can be
achieved in a safer and more capable manner with the initial combination of Interim and Legacy Forces and,
eventually, with the Objective Force. Added to this is the fact that the full operational spectrum is a permanent fixture
of the new environment, and that by orienting against threats across this spectrum, the Army will develop a more
versatile and agile Objective Force that can provide the National Command Authorities more options and will thereby

improve the chances of "getting it right" in the transformation process. From the Powell Doctrine, there is the reminder
that absent prioritization, the characteristics of the Objective Force may only ensure the equivalent of a more speedy
dispatch of Custer and his troops to the Little Big Horn. Moreover, there is also the emphasis on restraint with the
fascination concerning the technological revolution--that in fact technology is not a panacea for the use of military
force and needs to be disciplined by the concomitant development of doctrine and organization and the realities of
committing landpower in force intervention. In the end, the net result has been to reinforce the three-force Army
initiative for achieving acceptable transformation risk in the near-, mid-, and long-term.
This is an essentially conservative approach to a revolutionary process. But it has the merit of using the synergism of
change and continuity to maximum effect.[67] Moreover, in a time of resource constraints, by initially transforming a
small part of the force and linking it to the past and present, the process has avoided creating two armies, an important
aspect of congressional relations as transformation proceeds. Additionally, Army transformation has stirred important
debates--in sharp contrast to the French experience in the interwar years when the High Command would not allow
dissenting opinion on doctrine. "Everybody got the message," André Beaufre noted in his memoirs, "and a profound
silence reigned until the awakening of 1940."[68] Equally important, there has been little of the strident advocacy in
either camp like that of J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart in interwar Britain, which exacerbated the split between
the innovators and the large mass of professional soldiers, thus assuring that the ideas of the innovators played a
decreasing role in the preparation of British ground forces for the next conflict.[69]
In any event, the current debates on Army transformation reflect a positive interest in the process of change, which is
always a good thing. In the interwar United States, where there was no interest for the most part in the military, there
was no pressure to change. In the case of the American horse cavalry, this resulted in tacit permission for the cavalry
professional to romanticize an increasingly untenable situation in the most mechanized nation in the world.
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